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SYMPOSIUM
CELEBRITY PROSECUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Gary C. Williams*
It may not be empirically demonstrable, but it certainly appears
there are more "trials of the century" today than at any other time in
American history. Most of these twenty-first century high-profile
trials assume prominence not because there are monumental
constitutional issues at stake, as in the Scopes Monkey trial,' because
important societal values are implicated, as in the Scottsboro Boys
cases,2 or because democratic values are being tested, as in the
prosecution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.
3
Today's "trials of the century" command media attention and
occupy the collective consciousness primarily because of the
prominence of people who accuse or stand accused. In this new
millennium we bounce from one high profile criminal proceeding to
the next without pause. Winona Ryder was convicted of shoplifting
in 2002. 4 Kobe Bryant was accused and prosecuted for sexual
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Gary Williams was staff counsel for
the Agricultural Labor Relations Board from 1976-79 and staff attorney for the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California from 1979-85.
Williams was appointed assistant legal director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Southern California in 1985, a position he maintained until
joining the Loyola Law School faculty in 1987.
1. Gabriel Acri, Persistent Monkey on the Back of the American Public
Education System: A Study of the Continued Debate Over the Teaching of
Creationism and Evolution, 41 CATH. LAW. 39 (2001).
2. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48, 51, 61-67 (2000).
3. Atossa M. Alavi, The Government Against Two: Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg's Trial, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2003).
4. Kristina Sauwerwein, Warning, Probation for Ryder, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
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assault in 2003-04.5 Martha Stewart was convicted of lying to
federal investigators in 2004.6 Michael Jackson was accused and
tried for child molestation in 2005. 7 Scott Peterson was convicted of
murder in 2005 8. Robert Blake was accused and tried for murder in
2005. 9 Today, Phil Spector is awaiting trial for murder.' °
To the legal professional these cases are largely unremarkable.
They involve basic factual disputes, do not presage new de-
velopments in legal theory, and do not present monumental
constitutional or societal issues. Starkly put, these cases command
public attention and extensive press coverage because of the fame or
infamy of the accused or the accuser.
Given this characteristic, these "trials of the century" may
accurately be designated "celebrity prosecutions." The attention the
press gives to these celebrity prosecutions, and the challenges that
attention poses for the criminal justice system are the subjects of this
symposium. While the authors' viewpoints are disparate, the
unifying theme of their essays is that celebrity prosecutions impose
extraordinary pressure on the judicial system and demand a fresh
look for solutions to the problems that pressure creates.
One measure of the problems created by celebrity prosecutions
are the changes in the law and the administration of justice that have
been wrought in response. The failed prosecution of O.J. Simpson
resulted in a modification of the California Evidence Code,' 1 and an
7, 2002, at B 1.
5. Mike Bresnahan, Laker Report: Teams Mimic Bryant Double-Team,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at D 11.
6. Leslie Earnest, Martha Stewart Convicted, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at
C1.
7. Steve Chawkins, Stuart Pfeifer & Megan Garvey, Jackson Acquitted on
All 10 Counts, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at Al.
8. Maria L. LaGanga & Tonya Alanez, Scott Peterson Gets Death for
Murders, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at B1.
9. Andrew Blankstein & Jean Guccione, Actor Robert Blake Acquitted in
Shooting Death of His Wife, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at Al.
10. Spector's Trial in Slaying of Actress Postponed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2006, at B4.
11. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1370 (West 1996), was enacted as an "urgency
statute" in 1996, the year following the acquittal of O.J. Simpson. This
provision permits the introduction of a hearsay statement if it purports to
narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the
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addition to the California Rules of Professional Responsibility, noted
in the essay by Mark Geragos. 12  The Kobe Bryant prosecution
resulted in the issuance of a prior restraint against the press, though it
is extremely rare for a court to issue a prior restraint in a matter that
does not involve national security.' 3 The succession of celebrity
prosecutions has led to increasing judicial reliance upon very broad
gag orders that cover counsel, the parties and now, witnesses and
their attorneys. In the Michael Jackson prosecution the gag order
issued by the court covered counsel, parties, witnesses and potential
witnesses. Its language was so broad that it became a staple source
of comedy for Jay Leno on the Tonight show before the court
modified the order as it applied to Leno.14
Celebrity prosecutions have even led to the creation of a new
profession. Because the crush of media coverage can be
overwhelming to court personnel, the judiciary, and the media, there
are now "media coordinators" who serve as liaisons between
journalists, law enforcement, the judiciary and the attorneys.
15
Media coordinators exist for several reasons. Celebrity prosecutions
often jam courtrooms, necessitating allocation of scarce seating.
Similarly, celebrity trials tax courthouse facilities, due to the media
declarant, and the declarant is unavailable. Section 1370 was adopted by the
California Legislature after similar evidence was ruled inadmissible in the
Simpson murder trial.
12. Mark Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of Supersized
Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1167 (2006), nn. 65-67 (discussing the adoption
of Rule 5-120, which details an attorney's ethical obligations regarding extra
judicial statements).
13. Jeffrey Matrullo, People v. Bryant and Prior Restraint: The Unsettling
of a Settled Area of Law, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 347, 356-58 (2005).
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky said the Bryant ruling flies in the face of a long
line of U.S. Supreme Court rulings going back to the 1932 Near v. Minnesota
ruling. Steve Henson and Henry Weinstein, Court Bars Disclosure by Media,
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at D 1.
14. Steve Chawkins, Gag on Jackson Gags is Loosened, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2005, at B1. Because Leno was a potential witness, under the language of
the gag order he could not talk about the case on his show, even in jest. Leno
proceeded to enlist other comics to relate jokes about the trial until he obtained
a release from that portion of the order. The article reports Leno told 25
Jackson jokes on the evening Leno was freed of the restriction.
15. Robin Abcarian, The Go-to Guy at Jackson Trial, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2005, at El.
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need for electricity, internet access, and space to conduct interviews.
Celebrity prosecutions can disrupt other proceedings, and at times
overwhelm scarce courthouse parking space.
16
In the general milieu of criminal prosecutions, the constitutional
principles of freedom of the press and the right to a fair criminal trial
are complimentary. The freedom accorded to the press to report on
judicial proceedings is one method for guaranteeing fair criminal
trials. Public scrutiny of criminal prosecutions through the lens of
media coverage reduces the temptation for judicial, prosecutorial and
defense misconduct.' 7 But in a celebrity prosecution these consti-
tutional rights seemingly come into conflict, rather than exist in
harmony. Certainly that is the view of Mark Geragos, and the view
of the judges described in the essays by Paul Hoffman and Craig
Matsuda. These legal advocates and jurists believe that extensive
publicity before and during a high profile criminal trial often
degrades or destroys a defendant's right to an impartial jury and a
fair trial. These jurists and advocates attribute this detrimental effect
to the wide public dissemination of inadmissible evidence and the
discussion of "just verdicts" by commentators and analysts before all
of the evidence is elicited.
Jury pools are contaminated by pre-trial publicity, and in many
cases there is the fear that publicity during a trial will get back to
jurors despite the best efforts of the judiciary to immunize them from
press coverage.
The authors in this symposium approach these issues from four
unique perspectives. Mark Geragos is a prominent defense attorney
who has been involved in several high profile trials. He explores the
problem of trial publicity and its effect on a celebrity defendant's
right to a fair trial. Mr. Geragos argues that pre-trial publicity in
celebrity prosecutions almost inevitably works to the detriment of the
criminal defendant. He documents cases where prosecutors have
used an arrest to publicize their theory(ies) for guilt of the accused,
then requested gag orders to prevent defense counsel from
commenting on the cases to counteract the impact of the prosecu-
torial press conference. Mr. Geragos also documents how pre-trial
publicity can operate to prejudice a jury venire against a defendant in
16. Id.
17. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 n.9 (1980).
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a high profile prosecution. He argues that in some cases pre-trial
publicity makes it virtually impossible to assemble a jury that has not
prejudged the case against the defendant.
Mr. Geragos writes that the media's insatiable hunger for stories
about sensational trials has exacerbated this problem. He surmises
that the rise of cable television, the advent of Court TV and the
emergence of the internet as a news source have expanded the role of
the press in degrading a defendant's right to a fair trial. Geragos says
it is virtually impossible to avoid pre-trial contamination of the jury
pool in a celebrity prosecution because of national cable news and
the saturation coverage of such prosecutions ensures that potential
jurors everywhere will likely know about the case.18 The related
problem, in his view, is the negative impact this coverage has on the
presumption of innocence. He argues that where most, if not all,
potential jurors know something about the facts of a case due to
media coverage, the presumption of innocence is meaningless.
Mr. Geragos documents the remarkable problem of stealth
jurors. He defines stealth jurors as people who, due to the publicity
generated by celebrity prosecutions, dissemble in an effort to be
seated on a celebrity prosecution jury. He identifies two motives for
stealth jurors: a desire to see the defendant convicted, or the desire to
seek fame and perhaps fortune in the aftermath of celebrity
prosecution jury service. Mr. Geragos argues that the phenomenon
of stealth jurors illustrates why voir dire has become an inefficient
tool for counteracting the effects of saturation pre-trial publicity.
Drawing on the British example, Mr. Geragos proposes that
Congress and state legislatures address these problems by enacting
laws explicitly giving courts the power to sanction reporters,
newspapers and other press outlets if their coverage creates "a sub-
stantial risk that the course of justice will be seriously impeded."'1 9
Mr. Geragos acknowledges that his proposal raises substantial First
Amendment concerns, but he argues that the freedom of the press
must be balanced against the detrimental impact on a criminal
defendant's right to an impartial jury and a fair trial decided strictly
on the evidence admitted during that trial.
Paul Hoffman addresses an issue created by the increasing
18. Geragos, supra note 12, at 1170-74.
19. Geragos, supra note 12, at 1192.
December 2006] 1161
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 39:1157
reliance upon gag orders in celebrity prosecutions and the pro-
liferation of legal commentators. These converging trends have
forced one court to decide whether a commentator may be barred
from publicly discussing a case because she represents one of the
witnesses in that prosecution.
Mr. Hoffman begins by arguing that gag orders in general do
little to promote fair criminal trials. In support he cites opinions
holding that pre-trial publicity, even if it includes discussion of
inadmissible evidence, does not necessarily deprive a defendant of a
fair trial.20  Hoffman argues that voir dire and effective jury
instructions are, even in celebrity prosecutions, adequate remedies
for the effects of pretrial publicity.2'
Hoffman goes on to discuss the gag order issued against Gloria
Allred, a prominent attorney and well known legal commentator.
Ms. Allred was representing a potential witness in a high profile
22criminal prosecution. The District Attorney and defense counsel in
that case jointly asked that Ms. Allred be included in a gag order
restricting public comments about the prosecution.23 The trial judge
granted that request, issuing an order so broad that it effectively
prevented Ms. Allred from making any public comments about the
case-even if her comments had nothing to do with her client or that
client's potential testimony.
24
20. Michael Seplow & Paul L. Hoffman, Punishing Pundits: People v.
Dyleski and the Gag Order as Prior Restraint in High-Profile Cases, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1195, 1205-12 (arguing that the Supreme Court's reversal of
Sheppard's murder conviction in Sheppard v. Maxwell was based on more than
the existence of pre-trial publicity).
21. Id. at 1216.
22. Verdict of the Jury, People v. Dyleski, Case No. 3-219113-8, (Contra
Costa County Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.contracostacourts.org/
specialaccess/assets/dyleski/0125-082806.pdf.
23. Notice of Motion for Gag Order, People v. Dyleski, Case No. 3-
219113-8, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.contra
costacourts.org/specialaccess/assets/dyleski/0010-102605.pdf; People's Re-
quest for a Protective Order, People v. Dyleski, Case No. 3-219113-8, (Contra
Costa County Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.contracostacourts
.org/specialaccess/assets/dyleski/0009-102605.pdf.
24. See Amended Protective Order, People v. Dyleski, Case No. 3-219113-
8, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2006), http://www
.contracostacourts.org/specialaccess/assets/dyleski/0018-102805.pdf; see also,
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Hoffman argues that the breadth of this order violates the First
Amendment by impinging on Ms. Allred's right to discuss publicly
any aspect of the criminal proceedings. While he acknowledges that
courts possess broad authority to control pre-trial publicity, he argues
that power must be exercised consistent with First Amendment
concerns. Specifically, he contends that gag orders cannot,
consistently with the First Amendment, be aimed at curtailing all
pre-trial publicity. Rather, courts should be limited to taking
reasonable measures to ensure that a criminal trial is heard by a fair
and impartial jury, and that the case is decided only on the facts
admitted at trial. Hoffman further argues that courts must, in
fashioning gag orders, be cognizant of counsel's need to be able to
speak publicly on behalf of her client, and of the public's right to
engage in debate about the criminal justice system.
Craig Matsuda is a distinguished member of the press who is
quite familiar with the demands of covering celebrity prosecutions.
Mr. Matsuda makes three important points in the debate about the
25impact of such cases on the criminal justice system. First, he
argues that press coverage of criminal prosecutions and trials is an
essential element of the public's right to know. Second, he notes that
the public demands coverage of celebrity prosecutions. Third, he
asserts that the media must meet those demands.
At the same time Mr. Matsuda acknowledges the need to
maintain decorum in the criminal justice system. He recognizes
celebrity prosecutions have tarnished judges, lawyers and the media
because of the circus atmosphere they create.
Recognizing the tension between the competing imperatives of
the public's need to know and criminal defendants' right to an
impartial jury and a fair trial, Mr. Matsuda proposes an intriguing
Letter to G. Allred from Judge Flinn-Modified Protective Order for Clarity,
People v. Dyleski, Case No. 3-219113-8, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.contracostacourts.org/specialaccess/assets/dyleski/
0017-102805.pdf.
25. Craig Matsuda, Courting the Stars: Why the Legal System Needs
New(s) Thinking for Overpowering Celebrity Trials, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
1221, 1222-23 ("Celebrity cases will inevitably arise, they will sorely test the
system's mettle, and there will be huge and indisputable interest in them. This
is exactly the time for the courts to show themselves and their processes at
their best-and not to be arcane, secretive, bumbling or fumbling.").
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solution-the creation of a Celebrity Court. Under Matsuda's
proposal the Celebrity Court would be located in Los Angeles, a
venue where jurors will not necessarily by star struck by the notion
of hearing a case involving supermodel A or sports superstar X. The
Celebrity Court administrator would have experience dealing with
high-profile litigation, which would minimize problems such as the
inadvertent release of sealed documents. Celebrity Court judges, by
virtue of their experience both in Los Angeles in general and as
members of the celebrity court bench, would not be overwhelmed by
the prospect of another icon appearing in their courtroom. Matsuda
theorizes that because the Celebrity Court bench would have
extensive experience handling high profile prosecutions, its judges
would be less tempted to issue overbroad gag orders or impose
overly restrictive limitations on press coverage.
Mr. Matsuda speculates that if a Celebrity Court were created,
special facilities could be built or located to house its proceedings.
That facility could be designed to handle the crush of press coverage.
Special cameras and equipment could be installed in the courtroom
to allow fuller coverage of its proceedings while minimizing
intrusion. A special venue could be designed to handle the need for
increased parking, interview spaces, security, courtroom seating
capacity, and other problems associated with celebrity prosecutions.
Costs assessed to the media due to needs generated by celebrity
prosecutions would be reduced. Disruption of other judicial
proceedings would be eliminated. And the Celebrity Court might
permanently retain the services of a courtroom coordinator to further
facilitate its smooth operation.
While Mr. Matsuda may be writing with his tongue planted in
cheek, the idea of creating a Celebrity Court warrants consideration.
As he points out, there is ample precedent for the creation of courts
to handle specialized issues. And because Matsuda's proposal makes
resort to the Celebrity Court a matter of choice for the defendant, it
will not infringe on the defendants' constitutional rights. Mr.
Matsuda argues that many celebrity defendants might welcome
transferring their cases to this court. The specialized knowledge,
personnel and procedures of the Celebrity Court might go a long way
toward ameliorating some of the harms to the right to an unbiased
jury and fair trial identified by Mr. Geragos.
Ms. Laurie Levenson is a Professor of Law at Loyola Law
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School in Los Angeles. Professor Levenson has provided legal
commentary on high-profile cases, including the Rodney King,
Reginald Denny, Menendez Brothers, and O.J. Simpson trials. She
has worked as an expert legal consultant for CBS News, CNN, and
NPR, and has worked as a columnist for the Los Angeles Times, Los
Angeles Daily Journal, and National Law Journal.
Professor Levenson addresses the possible conflicts of interest
that face high-profile prosecutors when handling cases that garner
great media attention.26 The added pressures of high-profile cases,
she argues, may lead prosecutors to commit the most basic ethical
violations. To explore the issue, Professor Levenson examines three
recent high-profile cases: the Michael Jackson child molestation trial,
the Jesse James Hollywood murder prosecution, and the clemency
proceedings of Michael Morales.
Professor Levenson identifies a series of lessons learned from
careful examination of these cases. 27 First, she warns that high-
profile cases are more likely to create conflict issues for prosecutors.
In order to protect against this, she suggests that prosecutors include
a full review of their ethical duties at the top of their case preparation
checklist. Second, she urges prosecutors to safeguard their
objectivity when interacting with the media, in that prosecutors
should only reveal to the media that information which is absolutely
necessary. Third, she urges prosecutors to avoid becoming
financially or personally invested in a case as this may endanger their
objectivity. Finally, she states that prosecutors should not give the
appearance of a conflict in a high-profile case, in order to preserve
the legitimacy of the criminal process.
Human nature being what it is, celebrities will continue to run
afoul of the law. That truism, coupled with the continuing explosion
of news sources and the public's apparent fascination with celebrity
prosecutions, will continue to generate extensive media coverage.
The pressures created by that coverage will continue to threaten the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, vex counsel, tax the
judiciary and bedevil the criminal justice system. This symposium
26. Laurie L. Levenson, High-Profile Prosecutors & High-Profile
Conflicts, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1235, 1235 ("The pressure to succeed too
often causes prosecutors in the spotlight to make strategic and ethical decisions
that can backfire against their case.").
27. See id. at 1250-54.
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will, ideally, provide a starting point for a dialogue among the bench,
the bar, the press and legal academia seeking solutions for current
problems and anticipating future challenges.
